God, Civil Society, and Congregations as Public Moral Companions by Simpson, Gary M.
Luther Seminary
Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary
Faculty Publications Faculty & Staff Scholarship
2009
God, Civil Society, and Congregations as Public
Moral Companions
Gary M. Simpson
Luther Seminary, gsimpson@luthersem.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the American Studies Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Practical Theology
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty & Staff Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. For more information, please contact
tracy.iwaskow@gmail.com, mteske@luthersem.edu.
Recommended Citation
Simpson, Gary M., "God, Civil Society, and Congregations as Public Moral Companions" (2009). Faculty Publications. 277.
https://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles/277
Published Citation
Simpson, Gary M. “God, Civil Society, and Congregations as Public Moral Companions.” In Testing the Spirits: How Theology Informs
the Study of Congregations, edited by Patrick R. Keifert, 67–88. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009.
God, Civil Society, and Congregations 
as Public Moral Companions 
Gary Simpson 
World War II ended more than fifty years ago, but the rage of nations did 
not. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, rage now tends to erupt less 
often between nations, more often within a single national border. Today, 
in the midst of the culture wars, 1 the rage of nations can be found inter-
nally in the United States, even in our heartland, which was demonstrated 
in the Oklahoma City bombing in the mid-199os. The metaphors that sat-
urate our daily discourse signal this raging: "the disuniting of America;' 
"the melting pot at boiling point," "drive-by politics," "hate radio." 
Some fifty years after America's victory abroad, will we suffer defeat 
at home? Will the noble American experiment of trying to be one nation 
simply overheat and explode? Something deeply moral is at stake in our 
nation's current rage. Conceivably, this rage, as a moral thermometer, mea-
sures both the thwarted hopes of the marginalized and the decreasing pos-
sibility for the good life of an increasing number of ordinary residents.2 
In the midst of this morally charged situation, how can Christian 
congregations hear again the call to serve in a public vocation? As we con- ~ 
sider this prospect, three questions will guide our inquiry. First, where 
1. James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: 
I3asic I3ooks, 1990). 
2. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan's widely read "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic 
Monthly, February 1994, 44-76, which also appeared in newspapers across the country. See 
also Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of foiling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class (New York: Pan-
theon Books, 1989). 
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might Christian congregations find a space in which they might attend to 
the public moral meaning of everyday rage? Such a public space is what we 
will refer to as civil society. Second, how can this public space of civil soci-
ety be accessed so that its moral possibilities can be maximized? We will 
investigate communicative moral practice as the best model for accessing 
the moral possibilities of civil society. Third, on what basis are Christian 
congregations free to engage in communicative moral practice within civil 
society. Here we will probe the Trinitarian doctrine of the crucified God 
whose freeing agency empowers Christian vocation. What a communica-
tive civil society needs, as it struggles with the moral meaning of our na- ,,, 
tion's rage, is the congregational vocation of public moral cornpanion.3 
Civil Society: Enriching Our Impoverished Public Spaces 
Already before the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern 
European dissidents were focusing on the renewal of civil society. They did 
so even in the highly restricted areas that were dominated by Soviet con-
trol. Here we refer to civil society as "the space of un-coerced human asso-
ciation and also the set of relational networks - formed for the sake of 
family, faith, interest, and ideology, that fill this space." These dissidents 
cultivated their fledgling democracies by nurturing their diverse social 
networks of churches, unions, neighborhoods, movements, and societies 
"for promoting and preventing this and that."4 
3. The congregational vocation of public moral companion does not, of course, pre-
clude other possible vocations. Furthermore, all congregational vocations stand intimately 
and distinguishably coupled with the congregation's fundamental missional identity as pub-
lic witness to salvation through Jesus Christ (see Marc Kolden, "Creation and Redemption; 
Ministry and Vocation," Currents in Theology and Mission 14 [February 1987]: 31-37). The 
mission statement of my own institution, Luther Seminary, strives in a similar way to claim 
a distinguishable togetherness between ministry and vocation: "Luther Seminary educates 
leaders for Christian communities called and sent by the Holy Spirit to witness to salvation 
through Jesus Christ and to serve in God's world." My purpose in this chapter is to particu-
larize the last phrase, "to serve in God's world," with a morally reflective and sociologically 
viable congregational strategy for the United States. For an especially winsome explication 
of the clause "to witness to salvation through Jesus Christ;' see Patrick Keifert, Welcoming 
the Stranger: A Public Theology of Worship and Evangelism (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992). 
4. Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society," Dissent (Spring 1991): 293. A more 
thorough investigation that draws on the seminal thinking of Jurgen Habermas is in Jean 
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We have lived in the United States with such an approach to civil so-
ciety for numerous generations, especially in the years since World War II. 
Most citizens have come to take it for granted in their everyday lives. But 
this neglect of attending to the dynamics of civil society has led to the im-
poverishment of public space. Our current increasing rage stands as a sign 
of the times of a diminished civil society. 
The United States' emergence as a world leader during the twentieth 
century necessitated the cooperation of the two megasystems of modern 
life in our country: the democratic state and the market economy. Our vic-
tory in World War II had much to do - not everything, but much - with 
the successful cooperation of these two great systems. The success of these 
great systems in the war effort progressively drew, even seduced, large 
numbers of ordinary Americans to shift their focus: they began to fixate 
their attention and energies on the so-called "real world" of these great 
systems to the detriment of maintaining a public space of civil society. 
This growing fixation by ordinary American people on the market 
economy and the democratic state draws on two rival Western heritages 
that were formulated over the last two centuries. Each of these intellectual 
heritages reveals something true about the pursuit of the good life in the 
modern era, but each does so by being too one-sided. The first heritage is 
the neoclassical republican tradition that was first proposed by Rousseau. 
He highlighted the moral agency of the citizen, and this has been the key 
for promoting democratic idealism ever since. In the republican heritage, 
the democratic political state is the public space of highest worth, and citi-
zenship is the goal that all other moral agencies must serve. 
The telling criticism of this heritage is not that democratic politics 
aren't good, for they surely are. Indeed, I would argue vigorously for the 
Cohen and Andrew Arato, "Politics and the Reconstruction of the Concept of Civil Society;' 
in Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarty, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, eds., Cultural-
Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1992), 121-42. Habermas's own investigation appears in Between Facts and Norms: Con-
tributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 
329-87. Peter Drucker, in a widely read article, has recently turned his attention to the signifi-
cance of civil society, which he refers to as "the social sector," and to the contributions that 
religious communities can make in it ("The Age of Social Transformation," The Atlantic 
Monthly, November 1994, 53-80). The concept of a communicative civil society would add 
more depth to William Dean's focus on "the third sector" as his recommended location for 
religious critics (111e Religious Critic ill American Culture [Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1994]). 
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democratic state as the best possible state in the modern era. Nonetheless, 
a problem remains. Paradoxically, even though the democratic state signif-
icantly touches the breadth of ordinary living, and for the larger part does 
so beneficially, it is not the everyday life of very many ordinary people. The 
attention, time, and energy of ordinary people is focused instead on earn-
ing a living. 
Earning a living awakens the other great Western heritage, that of the 
market capitalist tradition. This heritage spurns the citizen's fixation on 
the democratic state and focuses it instead on the economy as the place 
where moral agency can bring about the good life. The marketplace be-
comes the space of highest worth. With market as the root metaphor, even 
the moral agency of economic production plays second fiddle to the con-
sumerism that provides the good life. The controlling orthodoxy is that 
autonomous, personal, private choice is what drives the market for the 
benefit of all. Entrepreneurs cater to the choosing appetite of consumers, 
and they are esteemed as "much the best thing to be," as Michael Walzer 
puts it.5 It is to be a laissez-faire economy where, according to classic liber-
alism, economic production, consumption, and entrepreneurship must re-
main liberated from the state. Even the democratic state must keep its 
hands off the economy, thus the minimal state. 
This one-sidedness of the market capitalist heritage shows up in sev-
eral ways. Some come to the marketplace with far too few resources of 
their own to purchase the goods needed in order to participate effectively 
in our modern society. As a result, they feel left out and marginalized by 
the market economy. Many who come to the economic marketplace with 
enough resources to participate often do not sufficiently experience the 
good life in this space that they were looking for. Instead, they commonly 
experience a secular meaningless, even a heartless world. Many in this lat-
ter group search for a haven from the heartlessness of the marketplace, and 
they often end up in some cocooning space of private intimacy, such as the 
nuclear family or the familial-fashioned congregation. Disturbingly, far 
too many of them also find these private spaces to be just as heartless as the 
world of the economic marketplace or the democratic state. These en-
counters with heartlessness reveal that our private intimate spheres can be 
quite fragile. This is because they cannot flourish without being rooted in 
and accountable to the broader moral networks that constitute civil soci-
5. Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society:' 
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ety.6 Furthermore, our private spaces too easily become colonized, 
whether under the consumptive strategies of the economic marketplace, 
or under the administrative necessities of the democratic state. 
Tragically, neither of these two great heritages promotes an under-
standing of civil society, and thus each remains within its one-sidedness. 
This reality continues to contribute to the neglect and impoverishment of 
a morally significant public space. We revel in the cultural heritages of our 
everyday life-world. We coordinate our actions as groups according to per-
ceived shared norms around them, and through them we develop individ-
ual and social identities. These are the key features of our everyday life-
world: (a) our cultural embodiment, (b) our social integration, and 
(c) our socialization into citizenship and consumerism. These features 
have both an institutional dimension and a symbolic-metaphorical-
linguistic dimension. Civil society as a public space corresponds to the in-
stitutional dimension of our everyday life-world.7 However, we have the 
potential, by enriching civil society, to diminish the colonizing effects of 
both the marketplace, with its medium of money, and the state, with its 
medium of administrative power. At the same time, enriching civil society 
could also provide the more private spaces of our everyday life-world with 
a richer moral milieu. This would stand in contrast to the most common 
pattern of today, in which each solitary individual or family is trying to 
stitch together its own moral spaces. 
Congregations have traditionally exercised great influence regarding 
6. Christopher Lasch's account of the family, Haven in a Heartless World (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), remains flawed precisely because he does not account for the heartless-
ness of the family "haven" itself, leaving Lasch unable to locate and access the moral re-
sources that families themselves desperately need today. See Keifert, Welcoming the Stranger, 
for a trenchant account of the ideology of familial intimacy that infects much congrega-
tional life today. 
7. See Wolfhart Pannenberg's theological analysis of "institutions" as an approach to 
the Reformation teaching about the "orders of creation" in Anthropology in Theological Per-
spective (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1985), 397-416. See also Carl Braaten, "God in Public 
Life: Rehabilitating the 'Orders of Creation,"' First Things, December 1990, 32-38. Robert 
Bellah and his associates correctly portray the difficulty that many Americans have in un-
derstanding how much of our everyday lives is lived in and through institutions; see llellah, 
The Good Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 3-18. Though much is good in this book, 
Bellah et al. also do not make "civil society" a theme. This remains a major flaw in their con-
ceptualization of "the public church," where "God Goes to Washington" is the beginning of 
their analysis. 
71 
---- ·------- -----------------------~ 
Gary Simpson 
the symbolic-metaphorical-linguistic dimension in addressing the three 
basic tasks noted above that are associated with the everyday life-world· 
Still, in our contemporary situation, the ongoing survival of the life-world 
needs the institutional dimension that we have called "civil society." Here 
is where a plurality of institutional embodiments can come together for 
the mutual enrichment and recreation of a lively moral milieu. The multi-
plicity of struggling- and often isolated - institutions that are native to 
civil society are beginning to cry out to one another for help. Given a mor-
ally rich enough texture to civil society, even economic and governmeot 
institutions could enter this space without dominating it. This would helf' 
bring valuable moral assistance to these institutions and their systemic 
worlds. By giving ear to these cries for help in developing a civil societ}', 
Christian congregations are recognizing a renewed calling, a public moral 
vocation. What kind of access is available to congregations for engaging 
the moral possibilities of civil society as they serve as public moral compaw 
ions to the institutions of civil society? 
Models of Moral Access to Civil Society 
During those times when Americans have attended to civil society, three 
models have functioned to give institutions and Christian congregations 
access to its moral possibilities: the agonistic, the liberal, and the communi-
cative.8 Historically, the first two have dominated the American imagina-
tion and practice; unfortunately, as we shall see, this has also contributed 
to the current impoverishment of civil society. In the agonistic model, the 
dominant practices of civil society revolve around a competitive struggle 
among rival versions of personal moral virtue. In this model each rival tra-
dition presents itself as a pure, self-sufficient, and cohesive totality of vir-
tue. A tradition vies for preeminence over other traditions by displaying its 
moral ideals as publicly as possible. Each strives to gain the support of the 
majority of citizens who begin as passive onlookers, continue as active im-
itators, and finish as admired moral masters. These agonistic practices 
tend to lead to the dominance of a single agenda of personal virtue, which, 
in turn, downplays those of rival traditions. 
8. Seyla 13enhabib, "Models of Public Space;' in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the 
Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 73-98. 
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With the agonistic model, civil society remains particularly suscepti-
ble to the technological temptations of the now ever-present sound bite. 
Conventional cliches, simplistic stereotyping, and either/or scenarios fill 
the airwaves with simplistic moral assertions. Communitarian heritages 
often promote this model, as do certain Christian movements with a more 
sectarian slant.9 The advantage of the agonistic model is that personal vir-
tues for practical face-to-face living are cultivated via the economy and 
politics; but these systems are themselves shielded from moral consider-
ation. The social costs remain steep. 
The liberal model of civil society originated in order to squelch the 
moral totalitarian consequences of the agonistic civil society. In the liberal 
model, moral discourse is subject to the constraint of neutrality whenever a 
single moral tradition asserts that its moral conception of the good life is 
superior to others. The constraint of neutrality prohibits three things: 
(a) agonistic trumping; (b) translating moral disagreements into a suppos-
edly neutral framework; and ( c) transcending moral disagreements by imag-
ining some hypothetical circumstance. Instead of these approaches, moral 
traditions must agree not to disagree in public; rather, they must confine 
their moral disagreements to private spheres. Not only does this model pri-
vatize the act of disagreeing; it also privatizes the very terrain of controversial 
subject matters. The result is that liberal civil society accedes more and more 
relevant moral issues to the private-sector economy, or to lifestyle intimacy, 
or to the religious conscience. Along the way, the liberal model also 
privatizes the congregation. Paradoxically, the practices of the liberal model 
contribute to the withering away of the very space of civil society. 
In the midst of these two traditional models of civil society, a new 
model - the communicative model - is emerging. 10 A communicative 
civil society shares certain features with the other dominant models. Like 
the agonistic model and unlike the liberal model of neutrality, it welcomes 
questions of moral truth that have practical import for the everyday life-
9. The most influential contemporary version is Stanley Hauerwas and William H. 
Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon, 1989). My pro-
posal of the congregational vocation of public moral companion contrasts sharply with the 
Hauerwas-Willimon "colony" proposal and with other solely "contrast community" visions 
of the congregation. 
10. See Gary Simpson, "Human Nature and Communicative Ethics;' dialog 33 (Fall 
1994): 280-87, for an introductory essay on communicative ethics and for a more complete 
bibliography of this emerging trajectory of moral reflection. 
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world. Unlike the agonistic model, with its characteristic practices of elitist 
moral display and purist moral trumping, the communicative civil soci-
ety's hallmark is that its claims to practical moral truth must be redeemed 
critically through participatory practices. Participatory practices empower 
institutions that are affected by a moral claim to have a say in the formula-
tion and adoption of moral norms. Boldly stated, the communicative civil 
society "comes into existence whenever and wherever all affected by gen-
eral social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse, 
evaluating their validity." 11 
By elevating participatory aspects, the communicative model es-
chews the totalizing and colonizing tendencies of the agonistic model, but 
without succumbing to the liberal model of public moral neutrality. The 
communicative civil society develops the capacity for creative moral possi-
bilities through communicative practices; it also focuses on the systematic 
distortions that often accompany the self-interested bias of any single 
moral tradition. 12 Furthermore, the communicative model helps to over-
come the rigid boundaries that have been built between the public and 
private by promoting their overlapping terrains. 13 
The Crucified God and Creative Agency 
Behind this proposal for a communicative civil society breathes a Trinitar-
ian doctrine of the crucified God and a communicative mode of creative 
agency. This represents our third line of inquiry toward a congregational 
vocation of serving as a public moral companion. The Christian doctrine 
of God historically has recognized a close connection between creation 
and God; Christian history also testifies to the fateful confusion - indeed, 
fusion - between the two precisely because of their close connection. 
When creation and God are confused, creative moral agency becomes 
11. Benhabib, "Models of Public Space;' 87. 
12. Communicative ethics, such as Reinhold Niebuhr's, exercises a sharply double fo-
cus on both human moral resources and self-interested limitations. See esp. his Moral Man 
and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), xxiv. Niebuhr's subtitle, A 
Study in Ethics and Politics, manifests the weakness of his account that overlooks the public 
space of civil society as well as the communicative access to that space. 
13. See Nancy Fraser, "Talking about Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Con-
flicts in Welfare-State Societies;' Ethics 99 (January 1989): 291-313. 
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instrumentalized: it becomes a mode of moral soteriology in which the 
fundamental human relationship with God is fashioned on human moral 
agency. Such an outcome would subvert our proposal for the public moral 
companionship of Christian congregations. Therefore, we need a prelimi-
nary critical inquiry into the Christian doctrine of God. Two classic times 
of confessing will fund our exploration: the Trinitarian creed of Nicaea 
and Martin Luther's theology of the cross. 
The Trinitarian Creed of Nicaea 
The first confession to speak of the proper relationship between the doc-
trine of God and creation arrived with the Creed of Nicaea in 325 c.E. It 
was immediately defended by Athanasius, who was in disputation with the 
Arian doctrine of God and its soteriological significance of Jesus. The de-
bate that ensued provided the down payment for a more thoroughgoing 
critique of a moral soteriology that was based in a creation-mediated doc-
trine of God. Such a critical perspective is helpful precisely because we 
propose that congregations have a public moral vocation for the sake of 
the created world. 
Of course, Athanasius offers substantial and lengthy theological con-
tributions toward the doctrine of God, and yet he establishes in a mere two 
paragraphs several lasting insights. 14 We. will concentrate on four points: 
( a) the logic in the doctrine of God; (b) the soteriological difference in the 
contesting logics of God; ( c) the bitter root of the Arian logic of God; and 
( d) the soteriologically sweet fruit of the Trinitarian logic of God. 
The primary identifying attribute of the Arian doctrine of God is 
"one God, alone un-originate." 15 Athanasius notes that the meaning of 
"un-originate" is thereby logically indicated by its relationship to things 
originated, to things created. That is, the identity and name of God come 
by way of created reality. "[F]rom the fruit is the tree known." 16 The Arians 
14. llook 1, paragraphs 33-34 of Orations against the Arians (hereafter cited as Ar.) Un-
less otherwise indicated, we will follow the accessible translation in The Trinitarian Contro-
versy, ed. and trans. William Rusch (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980). These paragraphs include 
key sections written years earlier by Athanasius in De Decretis, 30-31. 
15. Si::e Arius's Letter to Alexander of Alexandria in Rusch, The Trinitarian Contro-
versy, 31. 
16. Here, in Ar. 1.35, as in other places, Athanasius cites Matt. 12:33. 
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agree. That is why, in their logic of God, they count Jesus as among things 
originated, a creature. He is the primordial, perfect creature through 
whom the rest of creation has its origin; but, as they emphasize repeatedly, 
he is most assuredly a creature and only a creature.'7 The Arians will as-
cribe any biblical attribute to Jesus so long as Jesus remains always and 
only on the creature side of the Creator/creation divide. 
When teaching this controversy regarding Jesus and the divinity of the 
Son, we theologians usually assume we are preaching to the choir, and that 
the choir already knows how bad it is to place the Son on the creation side of 
the divide. Fortunately, Athanasius does not hold such faulty assumptions. 
He realizes how seductive it is to name God as "the un-originate," since true 
Christian piety recognizes God as Creator and also ascribes to God other at-
tributes, such as "Almighty" and "Lord of the Powers." To expose the Arians' 
bait and switch of their doctrine of God for the Trinitarian doctrine, he must 
enter more deeply into the bitter logic of the Arian teaching. 18 
Athanasius's first step is simply to place the two logics side by side. 
Arians name God "un-originate" because they know and identify the deity 
only from God's originated works, with Jesus being the foremost of God's 
created works. A Christian Trinitarian view names God as "Father" be-
cause it knows and identifies the deity of this God from the Son. 
Athanasius sees this Trinitarian logic of God present in such classical 
Scripture passages as Matthew 11:27 and John 14:9. The bitterness of the 
Arian "one God, alone un-originate" remains closely bound up with the 
soteriological implications of God being so named. "Soteriology is pitted 
against soteriology, and neither adversary thinks otherwise." 19 Athanasius 
and the Arians also agree that the Arian creature-centered soteriology is 
emphatically a moral soteriology. 
17. For a succinct summary of the Arian doctrine of God and the role of Jesus, see 
J. N. D. Kelly, Eilrly Christian Doctri11es (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 226-31. 
18. Ar. 1.1. 
19. Robert C. Gregg and Dennis E. Groh, Early Aria11ism: A View of Salvlltioll (Phila-
delphia: Fortress, 1981), 54. Athanasius also notices the moral character of Arian soteriology, 
e.g., in Ar. 1.39-40. Only recently, through the work of Gregg and Groh, has the Arian invest-
ment in soteriology been investigated, while Athanasius's soteriological investiture has long 
been acknowledged right up to the contemporary classics, e.g., Justo Gonzalez, A History of 
Christia11 Thought, vol. 2 (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 299-310; Kelly, Early Clzristimz Doc-
trilles; Bernhard Lohse, A Short History of Christian Doctrille (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 
56-61; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1971), 193-207. 
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The soteriological difference in the contesting logics of God mani-
fests itself in the phenomenon of "praise and honor." These are Atha-
nasius's soteriological code words in our two paragraphs. Here Athanasius 
is at his best. "For if they [ the Arians] cared at all about praise and honor 
for the Father, it was necessary - and this was better and greater - that 
they know and say 'God the Father' rather than to name him thus [the un-
originated]." For, as he continues, "the more the Word differs from origi-
nated things, so much more would the statement that God is 'Father' differ 
from the statement that he is 'un-originated."'2° Following John 5:23, 
Athanasius comprehends deeply what the Arians ignore, namely, that 
whoever dishonors the Son will inevitably end up dishonoring the Father. 
"Praise and honor" are the anvil on which a creation-centered soteriology 
gets hammered out. He pursues the crux of his critique by canceling out 
the genetic source for the Arian logic of God. He wants to maintain a 
creature-centered soteriology and its warrant in a creation-mediated doc-
trine of God. 
Athanasius never tires of pointing out that it is the Greeks who dis-
covered the un-originated and who bequeathed their logic of God to the 
Arians. Not only is this identification of God unscriptural, but it is also 
suspect, "suspicious" in Cardinal Newman's famous translation,21 for it 
has "variegated meaning" by which our thoughts are "carried in many di-
rections" (Ar. 1.34). It is no wonder that if one would waver with the Un-
originate-mediated-through-the-originate, that one would also wobble in 
one's "praise and honor." It's also no wonder that the Arians have so little 
"confidence" in their discourse of their doctrine of God (Ar. 1.33). 
In the paragraphs that follow our two key ones, Athanasius contin-
ues to press the Arians about the indeterminate character of their 
soteriology and doctrine of God. The Arian logic leaves its followers 
trapped in the same cul-de-sac in which Greek religion had always dead-
ended, that is, its fate, its fickleness, and the dishonoring of God that it en-
genders.22 Athanasius credits Paul in Rom. 1-2 for exposing this trap. Jesus 
as the incarnated divine Son of the Father is a "better and greater" story al-
together, constituting the very trustworthiness of the deity and culminat-
20. Ar. 1.33. 
21. See Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953). 
22. Paul Tillich's analysis of the Greek preoccupation with fate remains one of the most 
salient; see Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 3-15. 
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ing in everlasting praise and honor of God. Taken together, Athanasius's 
defense of the Trinitarian logic of God offers us a substantial critique of a 
creation-centered doctrine of God. It also provides a budding hermeneutic 
of the trustworthiness of the Trinitarian God that is rooted in the logic of 
the reciprocal dependence of the Father and the Son (Ar. 2.64-72). 
Luther's Theology of the Cross 
Luther's theology of the cross picks up on this. First of all, it offers us an in-
tensified and expanded critique of the confusion of creation and God, thus 
preparing for their proper relationship. Second, it provides a more fully 
developed hermeneutic of divine trustworthiness that freely empowers 
congregations for the vocation of public moral companion with the cre-
ative agency of "the crucified God."23 
Luther's retrieval of the biblically inscribed theology of the cross 
flowers in his twenty-eight theological theses known as the Heidelberg Dis-
putation. And it flourished as the thoroughgoing criterion of his theology 
throughout his career. 24 Luther contrasts the theology of the cross with the 
full-blown theology of glory that was officially enthroned in medieval 
scholasticism. However, he emphasizes, as his interpreters often do not, 
that the source of the theology of glory lies within the sinful human condi-
tion. Strictly speaking, then, his critique focuses less on the "theology" of 
glory than on "theologians" of glory, every old Adam and old Eve in-
cluded. 25 Not until Theses 19-21 of the Heidelberg Disputation does Luther 
forthrightly name the disputing modes of theology - of glory and cross. 
He carefully readies us for the conflict in the theses by criticizing the moral 
23. See Luther's Works, American ed., vol. 31 (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1957), 225 
(hereafter LW). 
24. Heidelberg Disputation, LW 31: 39-70. That the theology of the cross is the distin-
guishing mark of Luther's theology throughout is Walter von Loewenich's influential thesis 
in Lut/zer's Theology of the Cross (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 12-13. 
25. For an investigation of the sinful human condition as the "source" of the theology 
of glory, see Robert W. Bertram, "How Scripture Is 'Traditioned' in the Lutheran Confes-
sions," in Kenneth Hagen, ed., The Quadrilog: Tradition and the Future of Ecumenism 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1994), 82-87. That "theologians," more than "theology," 
are the subject of Luther's inquiry is a point made by both Jtirgen Moltmann in The Cru-
cified God (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 208, and Gerhard Forde in On Being a Theolo-
gian of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997). 
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soteriology of good works (1-12) and free will (13-18). In fact, his break-
through is to notice the connection of a moral soteriology with the logic of 
the doctrine of God in the theology of glory. 26 
The theologian of glory, Thesis 19 declares, is that person "who looks 
upon the invisible things [being] of God as though they were clearly percep-
tible in those things which have actually happened [in those things which 
have been made, created]."27 These invisible things of God (invisibilia Dei) 
are, following Paul in Romans 1:19-20, God's power and divinity, wisdom, 
righteousness, goodness, and so forth. Here, in the glory theologian's logic of 
God, we hear the once-waning echo of the Arians' creation-mediated logic 
of God waxing eloquent again. 
In the centuries following Nicaea, medieval scholastic theology had 
returned to and even perfected the logic of a creation-mediated doctrine 
of God. They did so by returning to the auspices of Aristotelian philosoph-
ical assumptions. As Peter Lombard says authoritatively in the Sentences, 
"The human creature perceives the Creator in what is created in the world 
by virtue of the excellence through which the human towers above all 
other creatures and by virtue of the human creature's accord with all cre-
ation."28 This inductive reasoning from the effects to the cause, from the 
creation to the Creator, lies behind all cosmological arguments for the ex-
istence of God. It is a perspective that is available to the gentiles in their ef-
forts to develop a logic of God. But the problem, as Paul notes, is that hu-
manity, following such a logic, does not end up honoring God. As Luther 
acknowledges in Theses 19 and 20, honoring God comprises the truth of a 
"wise and worthy" humanity. So far, Luther's critique of a creation-
mediated doctrine of God corresponds to Athanasius's. 
Indeed, Luther enlarges Athanasius's critique of the creation-
mediated logic of God. He notes that the creation-mediated logic of God 
inevitably eventuates in a moral soteriology that instrumentalizes cre-
ation, God, and creative agency. This connection becomes explicit in The-
ses 22-24. Here he focuses on the use - or rather, the misuse - by hu-
26. V_pn Loewenich makes this point in Luther's Theology of t/ze Cross, 19-20. 
27. The bracketed translation comes from Moltmann, T/ze Crucified God, 208, and of-
fers a better understanding of Luther than does the standard English-language American 
edition. See von Loewenich's valuable insights regarding the translation and interpretation 
of this thesis. 
28. Cited by Moltmann, The Crucified God, 209. Moltmann's explication of the as-
sumptions and logic of the theology of glory is still one of the best available in English. 
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mans of the knowledge of and relationship with God available through the 
creation-mediated logic of God. First, that logic of God is not of itself evil. 
It is a wisdom that sees the invisible things of God in God's created works 
as perceived by humans. This is true for Luther as it is for Paul, because 
God is the one who makes himself available through creation in order to 
be praised and honored. However, people misuse this knowledge of God 
and the accompanying moral knowledge of God's law in the worst manner. 
Along with the innate capacities of "excellence" and "accord" that 
Lombard perceived in human nature, Luther targets the relational realities 
of "the old Adam" vis-a-vis God (Theses 18 and 21). 
Luther notes that sinful humans usually take the credit for their 
goodness of creaturely life, and for the basic trustworthiness on which the 
created world appears to rest. Furthermore, being "so presumptuous" 
(Thesis 18), humans take credit for establishing their fundamental rela-
tionship with God based on the righteousness of their own moral agency. 
As a result, people become "increasingly blinded and hardened," and even-
tually they end up "completely" so (Thesis 22). Creation-mediated knowl-
edge of God and of the moral law is never pure. It is always woven tightly 
together with one's own interest. In the case of sinners, their interests tend 
toward exalting the trustworthiness of human moral agency in establish-
ing, maintaining, and completing the relationship with God. Thereby sin-
ners instrumentalize God's good created world, and, in effect, they even try 
to instrumentalize God's own creative agency. Creation ends up suffering 
under such instrumentalization. 
God's creative and life-preserving "civil use of the law" can never be 
severed from what Luther and the Reformation call God's "theological 
use of the law," for "through the law comes knowledge of sin" (Rom. 
3:20).29 Luther incorporates this interpretive breakthrough regarding the 
law into Thesis 23: "The law brings the wrath of God, kills, reviles, ac-
cuses, judges, and condemns everything that is not in Christ." It is at the 
encl of the line of the theology of glory, of the creation-mediated knowl-
edge of God. Here is where sinners encounter "the alien work of God" 
(Thesis 4) - deus absconditus ("the hidden God"), as Luther often puts it. 
Even Christ on the cross executes the judgment of God as "works are de-
throned and the old Adam ... is crucified" (Thesis 21). With this under-
29. Pora classic discussion by Luther of the double use of the law, sec his commentary 
on Gal. 3:19 (LW 26: 306-16). 
So 
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standing, Luther intensifies Athanasius's critique of the creation-
mediated logic of God. 
Any proposal that extols the notion of the creational vocation of 
public moral companion, we believe, must first take this detour through a 
systematic critique of the creation-mediated logic of God. But our critical 
detour, while salutary, does not seem by itself to warrant our positive pro-
posal. On the contrary, such a critique might be construed to warrant just 
the opposite, that is, congregational disengagement from the created 
world's public moral spaces. This has often been the case in the history of 
Christian theology. It is important that we keep the diagnostic seriousness 
of the critique coupled with the hermeneutic of the trustworthiness of the 
crucified God (Theses 4 and 7).30 
The theology of the cross does not culminate with the crucified 
Christ as God's alien work of crucifying sinners. Rather, notes Luther, "an 
action which is alien [opus alienum] to God's nature results in a deed be-
longing to his very nature [ opus proprium]: he makes a person a sinner so 
that he may make him righteous" (Thesis 16). As Scripture often testifies, 
God works against appearances (Theses 4-6), "under the opposite" (sub 
contrario ). 31 Despite the sinful misuse of the knowledge of God mediated 
through creation, God "willed again to be recognized in suffering ... so 
that those who did not honor God as manifested in his works should 
honor him as he is hidden in his suffering" (Thesis 20). We have in the 
crucified Christ a second hiddenness of God that constitutes God's righ-
teousness-creating, and thus God's trustworthiness.32 
30. As Pelikan notes, "To a considerable degree, the definition of sin in church doc-
trine appears to have developed a posteriori, by a process which, proceeding from the salva-
tion in Christ and from infant baptism, made the diagnosis fit the cure" ( The Christian Tra-
dition, 1: 204). 
31. Perhaps Luther's most famous statement in this regard comes from Tlze Bondage 
of the Will. Summarizing "the nature of Christian faith itself;' he says: "[F]aith has to do 
with things not seen [Heb. u:1]. Hence in order that there may be room for faith, it is neces-
sary that everything which is believed should be hidden. It cannot be more deeply hidden 
than under :m object, perception, or experience which is contrary to it [ sub co11trario] . ... 
This is not the place to speak at length on this subject, but those who have read my books 
have had it quite plainly set forth for them" (LW 33: 62). 
32. llrian Gerrish speaks of the hiddcnness of God I and the hiddenness of God II in 
"'To the Unknown God': Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God:' in his Tlze Old Prot-
estantism and tlze New: Essays 011 tlze Reformation Heritage (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 14off. 
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Luther vividly describes the trustworthiness of God's righteousness-
creating through the image of "the happy exchange." Commenting on the 
power of faith, Luther says: 
[F]aith unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bride-
groom. By this mystery, as the Apostle teaches, Christ and the soul be-
come one flesh [Eph. 5:31-32]. And if they are one flesh and there is be-
tween them a true marriage - indeed the most perfect of all 
marriages, since human marriages are but poor examples of this one 
true marriage - it follows that everything they have they hold in com-
mon, the good as well as the evil. Accordingly the believing soul can 
boast of and glory in whatever Christ has as though it were its own, 
and whatever the soul has Christ claims as his own. 33 
With or without the phrase "the happy exchange," and with or without the 
marriage imagery, the redemptive dynamic of the happy exchange remains 
central in Luther's writing, especially in his sermons, lectures, and pastoral 
advice. For instance, in a 1516 letter to his fellow Augustinian monk George 
Spenlein, Luther urges him to "learn Christ and him crucified. Learn to 
praise him and, despairing of yourself, say, 'Lord Jesus, you are my righ-
teousness, just as I am your sin. You have taken upon yourself what is mine 
and have given to me what is yours. You have taken upon yourself what 
you were not and have given to me what I was not.' "34 
A few months after the Heidelberg Disputation, Luther preached his 
famous sermon entitled "Two Kinds of Righteousness," based on 
33. The phrase "the happy exchange" (in German, der froehliclze Weclzsel) appears in 
the German-language version of The Freedom of a Christian. 13ecausc the translation of The 
Freedom of a Christian in the standard English-language American edition was made from 
Luther's Latin original, the precise phrase "happy exchange" does not appear in the Ameri-
can edition, though the marriage imagery does. The "happy exchange" phrase does appear 
in 13ertram Lee Woolf's English translation of The Freedom of a Christian because he trans-
lated from Luther's German version (Reformation Writings of Martin Luther, vol. 1 [London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1952], 363). 
34. LW 48: 12. On the power of faith, see Luther's famous commentary on Gal. 3:6 (LW 
26: 226-36). Robert W. Bertram offers the most insightful close reading of Luther's redemp-
tive dynamic as it appears in Luther's famous 1535 Lectures on Galatians ("Luther on the 
Unique Mediatorship of Christ;' in H. George Anderson, J. Francis Stafford, Joseph A. 13ur-
gess, eds., The One Mediator, the Saints, and Mary [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1992] 249-62). 
13ertram also notes how the "happy exchange" redemptive dynamic appears in Luther's ex-
planation of the second article of the Apostles' Creed in The Small Catechism. 
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Philippians 2:5-6. Here he uses the redemptive dynamic of the happy ex-
change to explicate "alien righteousness, that is the righteousness of an-
other, instilled from without." "Just as a bridegroom possesses all that is his 
bride's and she all that is his, for the two have all things in common be-
cause they are one flesh, so Christ and the church are one spirit."35 Later in 
the sermon, Luther highlights the bearing and extending character of the 
crucified Christ by contrasting him with that self-sufficient form of God 
that Christ "relinquished to the Father."36 
We now stand at the precipice of another, often overlooked, aspect of 
Luther's theology of the cross. This is the basis of soteriology in his under-
standing of the Trinitarian being of God. Luther extols the dependence of 
the Father's mercy on the persuasive mediation of the crucified Son. He 
knows that the soteriological effects of the happy exchange between Christ 
and church believers are anchored in what the Crucified effects in the very 
life of God.37 By bearing with sinners, Jesus extends to his Father the char-
35. LW 31: 297. 
36. LW 31: 301. See also Luther's interpretations of Gal. 2:20 and 3:13, which are classic 
discussions of Christ's bearing and extending (LW 26: 172-79, 276-88). See how David 
Fredrickson exploits the bearing and extending dynamic adhering in Paul's slavery meta-
phor in Philippians 2 (in his essay in this volume). 
37. LW 51: 277-80; LW 24: 252. One of Luther's most famous discussions in this regard 
takes place in his interpretation of Gal. 1:3. "Ilut why;' Luther inquires, "does the apostle add 
'and from our Lord Jesus Christ'? Did it not suffice to say'[ Grace to you and peace] from God 
the Father'? Why does he link Jesus Christ with the Father?" (LW 26: 28ff.) Robert Ilertram 
follows this line of inquiry by focusing on "that singular dependence of the divine Child 
upon the Parent, so powerful in its effect that in the process the Parent, indeed the whole 
Trinity, takes on a new identity and new associations. To ask for less god than that- but now 
the Christian answer is obviously shaping the question - not only risks moralism but risks 
underasking" (Ilertram, "Putting the Nature of God into Language: Naming the Trinity;' in 
Carl Ilraaten, ed., Our Na111i1Zg of God: Problems and Prospects of God-Talk Today [Minneapo-
lis: Fortress, 1989 ], 97). Ji.irgen Moltmann follows a similar line of inquiry: "I turned the ques-
tion around, and instead of asking just what God means for us IHmzan beings in the cross of 
Christ, I asked too what this human cross of Christ means for God" ( The Crucified God, x). In-
deed, David Fredrickson finds this rhythm within the famous Christ Hymn of Philippians 2. 
Or again: "It is"crucial to note that as the story unfolds God's action comes after Christ's. This 
fact, along with the 'wherefore (l\t6 )' of verse 9, implies that God's action in exalting Jesus and 
giving him the name beyond every name is God's response to Christ Jesus' innovative exten-
sion of participation in the divine community .... The Christ Hymn therefore ... narrates the 
actual formation of God's will in response to the political agency ofJesus Christ" (64-65). See 
also Eberhard Ji.ingel's explanation of the "twofold interruption" of the Crucified: "God in-
terrupts the continuity of our life as the one who allows our sin and death to interrupt his 
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acter and shape of his trustworthy, bodily communion with sinners. The 
Father's sending of the Spirit to raise the forsaken Jesus testifies to - in-
deed, constitutes - the Father's favorable reception of the Son's cruciform 
character as the Father's own. Ultimately, Christian soteriology rests in the 
reality of the crucified God. It rests in the reciprocal dependence of the Fa-
ther and the Son through the Spirit, as Athanasius emphasized long ago. 38 
Luther probes the connection between soteriology and the doctrine 
of God while explicating the communication or sharing of attributes, the 
so-called cornrmmicatio idiornaturn. These lie at the heart of the Trinitarian 
and Christological theology of the first four ecumenical councils. Luther's 
explanation of the critique of Nestorianism by the Council of Ephesus in 
431 c.E. is particularly pithy: 
Now if I were to preach, "Jesus, the carpenter of Nazareth (for the gos-
pels call him 'carpenter's son' [Matt. 13:55]) is walking over there down 
the street, fetching his mother a jug of water and a penny's worth of 
bread so that he might eat and drink with his mother, and the same car-
penter, Jesus is the very true God in one person;' Nestorius would grant 
me that and say that this is true. But if I were to say, "There goes God 
down the street, fetching water and bread so that he might eat and drink 
with his mother;' Nestorius would not grant me this, but says, "To fetch 
water, to buy bread, to have a mother, to eat and drink with her, are 
idiomata or attributes of human and not of divine nature." And again, if 
I say, "The carpenter Jesus was crucified by the Jews and the same Jesus is 
the true God," Nestorius would agree that this is true. But if I say, "God 
own life .... That is, man is defined by the eternal Father who allows himself to be interrupted 
by the crucifixion of his Son and, in this way, interrupts the continuity of our life; and, at the 
same time, in the loving unity of the Spirit with his Son, he enhances his life and ours" ("The 
Truth of Life: Observations on Truth as the Interruption of the Continuity of Life," in 
R. W. A. McKinney, ed., Creation, Christ a11d Culture: Studies in Honour of 1: i,: Torrance (Ed-
inburgh: T & T Clark, 1976), 236. I am grateful to Jonathan Case for this reference and for the 
importance of this notion in Jtingel. 
38. Wolfhart Pannenberg has undertaken the most thorough investigation of the na-
ture and implications of the reciprocal dependence of the Father and the Son and especially 
the notion, largely undeveloped in the entire history of Trinitarian theology, of the Father's 
dependence on the Son mediated in the history of Jesus. The underdevelopment of the reci-
procity of the persons discloses "a defect which plagues the Trinitarian theological language 
of both East and West, namely, that of seeing the relations among Father, Son, and Spirit ex-
clusively as relations of origin" (Systematic Theology [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991], 1: 319; 
see 308-19). 
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was crucified by the Jews;' he says, "No! For crucifixion and death are 
idornata or attributes not of divine but of human nature:'39 
Nestorius could not quite bring himself to Luther's conclusion, that 
is, to the bold Christian confession of a crucified God. This is because, as 
Luther notes, he held too deeply to the Greco-Roman basic assumption 
"that God and death are irreconcilable. It seemed terrible to him to hear 
that God should die."·10 Luther even chastises the Council of Ephesus for 
its "far too little" confession in this regard.41 Therefore, Luther emphasizes 
that "only ... if God's death and a dead God lie in the balance" is our salva-
tion accomplished.42 
The person and work of the Holy Spirit now come into the fore-
ground, as Luther emphasizes in The Large Catechism. The salvation ac-
complished by the crucified God would "remain hidden," even "vain" and 
"all lost;' if it were not for the agency of the Holy Spirit, who puts the ac-
complished salvation to "use" in us that it might be "enjoyed" by us and by 
God.43 Word and Sacrament are, of course, the publicly available media of 
the Holy Spirit's agency in this regard. 
The idea that through Word and Sacrament believers are incorpo-
rated into the communion of the Son with the Father finds its basis in the 
39. LW 41: 101. Whenever Luther richly maximizes the communication of attributes, 
he is in essence beginning to burst the old Trinitarian wineskins with the fixation on the re-
lations of origin to the neglect of the full reciprocity of the persons. Nevertheless, when Lu-
ther consciously turns to the doctrine of the Trinity, he remains largely within the strictures 
of the trajectory charted by Augustine (e.g., LW 15: 300-12). This situation warrants a more 
thorough exploitation, one that I hope to undertake in the future in the context of the con-
nection between contemporary Trinitarian theology and the doctrine of the atonement. 
40. LW 41: 102. 
41. LW 41: 104. 
42. LW 41: 103. Robert Jenson has a pithy way of putting Luther's point: "Christo logy is, 
or should be, the thinking involved in getting over the self-evidencies about God that anteced-
ent religion will in each case of the gospel's missionary penetration have hidden in the minds 
of this new sort of believers. A Christological proposition is adequate just insofar as it out-
rages something comprehensively and radically that everybody at a time and place supposes 
'of course' to be true of anything worthy to be called God" (Jenson, Unbaptized God: The Ba-
sic Flaw in Ecumenical Tlzeology [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992], 120). Jenson rightly notes -
though I differ with his analysis of "the basic fiaw" - tliat for Luther the traditional interpre-
tations of and conclusions regarding the communication of attributes were "too puny" (129). 
43. Tlze Large Catechism, in Tlte Book of Concord: The Confessions of tl1e Evangelical 
L11tl1eran Cl,,1rcl1, ed. Theodore 'fappert (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959), 415. 
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personhood of the Holy Spirit as the very "condition and medium" of tbe 
personal communion of the Son and the Father.4 ·1 Furthermore, "free 
agreement" marks the very mode of the personal communion at the heart 
of the Triune life of God.45 Finally, this communion of free agreement of 
the Father and the Son with and through the Holy Spirit exists as a "com-
municative" free agreement, because in Scripture and for the Reformatiol1, 
there is "no spirit that is not word."46 In the beginning was the "conversa-
tion" and the "conversation" was with God and the "conversation" was God-
So Luther!47 Not surprisingly, this communicative free agreement of the tri-
une God constitutes the source and mode of God's creative agency as well.48 
C The Trinitarian life of the crucified God forms the basis for the com-
municative mode of God's own creative agency. So also, it forms our voca-
tional participation in this mode of creative moral agency. We are now 
coming full circle. Christian vocation is freedom from our sinful 
instrumentalization of the created world that is effected by the trustwor-
thiness of the alien righteousness of the Crucified and received by faith. Io 
this vocational freedom, the entire created world remains the media and 
"masks" (larvae dei) of the triune God's creative agency. 49 Furthermore, 
Christian vocation is freedom for our "proper righteousness," which al-
ways retains its "basis," "cause," and "source" in Christ's alien righteous-
ness.50 In this vocational freedom we remain cooperators with God's cre-
ative agency (cooperatio dei) to bring temporal life into existence, to 
nurture that life, and to extend that life to all others.51 
44. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1: 316, 330. 
45. Pannenberg, Systematic 111eology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 30-31. 
46. Robert W. Jenson, "The Holy Spirit;' in Carl Bra,1ten and Robert Jenson, eds., 
C/1ristia11 Dogmatics, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 156. 
47. LW 22: 7-13. 
48. See Werner Elert's fruitful notion of the communicative mode of God's creative 
agency in The Christian Faith (Columbus, OH: Trinity Seminary Bookstore, 1974), 167-68; 
see also his The Christicm Ethos (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1957), 23-27. 
49. LW 26: 94-96. See Gustav Wingren's investigation of Luther's notion of the masks 
of God (Luther on Vocation [Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957], 137-43). This book still 
remains the best interpretation of Luther's understanding of vocation. Recalling Brian 
Gerrish's notion of a hiddenness of God I and a hiddenness of God II, might not Luther's 
understanding of Christian vocation warrant a hiddenness of God III? 
50. LW 31: 298. 
51. LW31: 55-56. One of Luther's most penetrating analyses of vocational cooperation 
appears in The Bondage of the Will (LW 33: 241-43). 
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On this point The Large Catechism is striking: 
Although much that is good comes to us from men, we receive it all 
from God through his command and ordinance. Our parents and all 
authorities - in short, all people placed in the position of neighbors 
- have received the command to do us all kinds of good. So we receive 
our blessings not from them, but from God through them. Creatures 
are only the hands, channels, and means through which God bestows 
all blessings .... Therefore, this way of receiving good through God's 
creatures is not to be disdained, nor are we arrogantly to seek other 
ways and means than God has commanded, for that would be not re-
ceiving our blessings from God but seeking them from ourselves.52 
Might there not also be emerging in our time and place, by God's own be-
stowal, a newly created and creative "good;' that is, a communicative civil 
society? This imaginative possibility, of course, lies behind the proposal for 
the vocation of congregations as public moral companions. Such a voca-
tion is, indeed, to the "praise and honor" of God. 
The Vocation of Congregations as Public Moral Companions 
Vocations are the places and ways that one and all participate in God's on-
going creative work. Through their vocations, people nurture and sustain 
temporal life in the world. In trusting the gospel of Jesus Christ, we ac- I 
knowledge these locations as God's creative work on behalf of our neigh-
bors and ourselves as God's creative companions. Like an individual, a con-
gregation also has a variety of vocations to bring God's creative work to 
bear on the life of our neighbors and our neighborhoods. Congregations 
that build up a moral milieu that makes life in our public communities pos-
sible are living out just such a calling. Civil society is the location for serving 
out this vocation of being a public moral companion. And communicative 
moral practice is the best model for nurturing the modern moral milieu. 
Vocationally, congregations participate in the moral life of civil sod- o 
ety in two ways, one more internal and the other more external. Internally, 
congregations have often assisted families in the task of the moral forma-
tion of its members, particularly of the young, and this will continue as a 
52. Tappert, ed., The Book of Concord, 368. 
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prime moral vocation of the congregation. However, as they engage in this 
vocation of moral formation, congregations sometimes fall prey to the 
temptation to view themselves as private Christian enclaves where they can 
protect themselves from the truth claims of other moral traditions. How-
ever, in our increasingly pluralistic public environment, multiple tradi-
tions now make claims on congregations. They bid congregations to offer 
justification, in the sense of ethical grounding, for the truth character of 
the moral formation imparted through congregational life. In this way a 
congregation exists, by default if not be design, as a meeting place of pri-
vate and public life.53 
~ It is in the meeting of the private and public that congregations re-
spond to their more external moral vocation as public moral companions. 
Today an increasing number of the institutions of civil society need moral 
companions who will accompany them in addressing the problems of con-
temporary life. Of course, this is a risky vocation, because Christian congre-
gations do not have a corner on the moral wisdom needed in many con-
flicted situations. As a public moral companion, a congregation becomes an 
encumbered community, encumbered with the moral predicaments of the 
other institutions of civil society. However, Christian congregations are no 
strangers to an encumbered life, to a life of the cross. Herein lies the re-
demptive moment that characterizes every vocation, when the encumbered 
companionship puts a congregation's efforts of self-protection to death.54 
In summary, consider certain marks that characterize the congrega-
tional vocation of serving as a public moral companion. As public moral , 
companions, congregations acknowledge a conviction that they participate 
in God's ongoing creative work. In a communicative civil society, congre-
gations exhibit a compassionate commitment to other institutions and their 
moral predicaments. The commitment of moral companions always yields 
a critical and self-critical - and thus a fully communicative - procedure 
for moral engagement. Finally, as public moral companions, congrega-
tions participate with other institutions of communicative civil society to 
help create and strengthen the moral fabric that fashion a life-giving con-
temporary society. 
53. See Martin E. Marty, "Public and Private: Congregation as Meeting Place," in 
James P. Wind and James W. Lewis, eds., American Congregations, vol. 2: New Perspectives in 
the Study of Congregations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 133-66. 
54. Kolden, "Creation and Redemption:' 36. 
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